about Tuggle's future dangerousness 9 was unrelated to the jury's decision that the murder was vile. 10 Since a Virginia capital sentence can stand even if supported by only one aggravating circumstance, the improper evidence was indeed harmless because it invalidated only the "future dangerousness" aggravator. 11 As this case illustrates, there are times where an appellate court should perform harmless error analysis of Ake errors. Rather than automatically going through a complete resentencing, the reviewing court should decide whether the error infected the jury's deliberation so thoroughly that it caused an unconstitutional defect in the trial.
The saga of Lem Tuggle came to a close on December 12, 1996. Twelve years after his conviction for the rape and murder of Jessie Geneva Havens, Tuggle was executed by the state of Virginia.
H. BACKGROUND

A. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN CAPITAL CASES SINCE 1UR44AN V.
GEORGIA
When the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Georgia and Texas capital punishment statutes in 1972,13 it in effect abolished capital punishment as it then existed in the United States. 14 The Furman Court held, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, that the challenged state laws constituted cruel and unusual punishment 5 as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 16 The essence of the concurring opinions 17 was that the lan-guage of the statutes was overly broad. 18 In particular, the Court pointed to the statutes' potential for allowing (1) too many or too few capital sentences and (2) capital sentences out of proportion with the crime.
1 9
Overinclusion and Underinclusion
The justices objected to the statutes' failure to limit or channel the sentencer's discretion. 20 Because the statutory parameters for imposing the death penalty were vague, 2 1 sentencing bodies exercised a great deal of discretion in their decision-making and invoked the punishment inconsistently. 22 The result was two common problems with capital sentences: overinclusion and underinclusion.
2 3 Overinclusion occurs when nearly any killing can qualify for capital punishment. Underinclusion is the imposition of the death penalty inconsistently from one trial to the next, resulting in less harsh penalties for equally heinous crimes.
2 5 When the Court upheld some revised capital statutes four years later, it reiterated that overinclusion and underinclusion create arbitrary and capricious results that violate the fundamental notions of fairness protected by the Eighth Amendment. 
Proportionality
The Court also banned death sentences unless the defendant was a major participant in a dangerous felony and exhibited a reckless indifference to human life; that is, the punishment had to be proportional to the crime.
2 7 At one point, the Court construed the proportionality doctrine so narrowly that only those who had killed, attempted to kill or intended to kill another human were eligible for the death penalty. 2 879 (1962) (stating that the decision to impose death as a punishment for murder was to be "determined purely by the dictates of the consciences of the individual jurors"). 22 Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring). [Vol. 87 cuted ten non-triggermen who were convicted of felony murder. 2 9 The Supreme Court allows felony murder to qualify as a capital crime whether the accomplice kills intentionally or accidentally. 30 
The States' Response to Furman
States reacted to Furman by revising their statutes to address the problems of underinclusion, overinclusion, and proportionality. The new capital statutes listed aggravating circumstances that, if present, designated certain killings as capital crimes. 3 1 Because the statutes required the presence of aggravating circumstances before the death penalty could be considered, they limited the discretion of juries and judges and thus solved the inclusion problems. 3 2 The statutory parameters also solved the proportionality discrepancies by setting objective standards for prosecutors to determine whether to seek the death penalty.
3 3 The legislative purpose, in accord with Furman, was to single out a subclass of killers who, because of the brutality of their crimes, society deemed deserving of death.
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In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the first of these new statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 35 thereby reinstating the death penalty as an acceptable sentence. The Georgia statute under which Gregg was convicted provided the sentencer with clear and objective standards that the Court believed would place reasonable limitations on the sentencer's discretion. 36 Justices Marshall and Brennan, however, held fast to the view that death is per se cruel and unusual punishment. 
Development of the Aggravating Circumstances Doctrine
Since Gregg, the Court has addressed the aggravating circumstances doctrine several times. Two of these decisions, Zant v. Ste 
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fendant found guilty of beating, robbing, kidnapping and murdering a man who interrupted Stephens and an accomplice as they were committing a burglary. 40 Thejury found three statutory aggravators: prior conviction of a capital felony; a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions; and commission of the offense while an escapee from jail. 4 1 Stephens appealed, arguing first that Georgia's "nonweighing" 4 2 scheme did not comport with Furman because it allowed too much discretion to the sentencer. 43 The Court disagreed, holding that the nonweighing statutory scheme added some measure of objectivity to the sentencer's decision-making process, which is all that Furman required. 44 Second, Stephens argued that his sentence could not stand because after the jury imposed death, an appellate court deemed one of the aggravating circumstances that supported the sentence was unconstitutional. 45 Specifically, while Stephens' case was on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that "prior convictions for assault" did not adequately narrow a sentencer's evaluation of a murder. 46 Nevertheless, the Court allowed Stephens' sentence to stand. 47 Though the jury instructions included a direction to consider the invalid circumstance in determining Stephens' sentence, the jury relied on two other valid aggravating circumstances which were sufficient by themselves to support the death sentence.
48
A second Georgia case illustrates that even when the aggravator passes constitutional muster, the court and the jury can misapply it. In Godfrey v. Georgia, the defendant shot and killed his estranged wife and mother-in-law. 49 Both women died instantly from shotgun blasts. 50 During the trial, the prosecutor stated three times that these murders involved no allegation of torture or aggravated battery. 51 The jury, however, returned death sentences for both killings based 40 Stephens, 462 U.S. at 864-65. 41 Id. at 864. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978) . 42 States are characterized as having a "weighing". scheme if the capital statute directs the sentencer to (1) consider any aggravating circumstance(s) present in a case as having more significance than any others; (2) place more weight to the presence of multiple aggravating circumstances rather than a single aggravator; or (3) balance the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard. Stephens; 462 U.S. at 873-74. 43 Id. at 874. 44 Id. at 879-80. 45 Id. at 880-84. 46 [Vol. 87 on its finding that they were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." 52 Both the trial judge and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.
3
The Supreme Court reversed. 54 The Georgia statute, which the Supreme Court had upheld against a constitutional challenge of vagueness just four years earlier, 55 allowed a death sentence if the offense included the aggravating circumstance of being "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." 5 6 In the earlier case, the Supreme Court ruled that this statutory aggravating circumstance met the narrowing requirement of Furman 5 7 as long as the Georgia Supreme Court did not rely on overly broad constructions of the language when applying it.- 5 In Godfrey, however, the Supreme Court found that the Georgia Supreme Court had not "implie [d] any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence" when it affirmed that the offense was only "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." 59 Because the sentencing instructions given by the trial judge did not sufficiently channel the jury's efforts, "the jury's interpretation of [the vileness aggravator defined in the statute could] only be the subject of sheer speculation.1 60 The Court found that "standardless and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury in this case was in no way cured by the affirmance of those sentences by the Georgia 69 Six weeks later, the CFP informed the court that drug therapy had resulted in Ake's becoming competent. 70 At no point during his stay in the state hospital did anyone evaluate Ake's mental condition at the time of the offense. 71 When Ake's attorney requested state assistance in obtaining such an evaluation-crucial information since Ake's sanity was his only defense at trial-the court refused. 72 At trial, the court instructed the jury to presume Ake to be sane unless he presented adequate evidence to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue. 73 Without a psychiatric expert, Ake could not meet that burden. The jury found Ake guilty on all counts. 74 Similarly, at sentencing Ake could not rebut the state psychiatrist's opinions that he was a future danger. 75 The jury called for The Supreme Court reversed Ake's sentences, holding that a psychiatrist is a basic tool of a defense. 7 7 Therefore, states have a constitutional responsibility to provide an independent psychiatrist (or funds for hiring one) to indigent defendants whose sanity will be an issue at trial. 7 8 In a special pretrial proceeding, a judge must decide whether the defendant can legitimately raise an insanity defense at trial. 7 9
The Court imposed this special pretrial procedure on the states after balancing the private and governmental interests at stake. 8 0 First, the Court held that the private interest in getting an accurate decision was "almost uniquely compelling" in a capital case. 8 ' Conversely, the Court found that the government's fiscal interest was minimal. 82 Forty other states and the federal government already had statutes requiring this type of expert assistance for indigent defendants, and those jurisdictions had not found the costs unbearable.
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Further, the state should gladly pursue any effort that aids in the search for truth in criminal prosecutions since the state's goal is to punish the true offender. 8 4 Finally, the Court underscored its analysis by pointing out that denying something as simple as psychiatric assistance created an unacceptable risk in a capital trial.85 If sanity is an issue, the defendant is entitled to have an expert explain his condition to the factfinder at both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial.86 Ake v. Oklahoma has been the source of considerable controversy and confusion. For example, some commentators have criticized the Court for requiring a pre-trial proceeding where the judge decides 76 Id. 77 Id. at 69-70. Justice Rehnquist dissented. See id. at 87-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After setting out the rest of the details of Ake's crimes, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Oklahoma statute treats psychiatric testimony as a question of fact. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Unless the expert commits perjury, the testimony about the facts of the defendant's mental condition should be the same no matter which side hires the psychiatrist. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). the merits of the defendant's insanity plea before the defendant has even seen a psychiatrist. 8 7 Other legal analysts, however, have stated that Ake is merely a good start and that indigent defendants have a right to whatever expert assistance is necessary to rebut the prosecution's case. 8 8
C. THE STANDARDS FOR HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
The harmless error doctrine allows a reviewing court to affirm a conviction in spite of a trivial, formal or merely academic error that occurred at trial. 8 9 Though sometimes constitutional errors are such that they can be subject to harmless error analysis, 9° most are not. 9 1 Brecht v. Abrahamson 9 2 identified two classes of constitutional errors-"trial" and "structural"-and established the bright line that separates them. In Brecht, the Court described trial and structural errors as follows:
[Trial] error occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence to determine its effect on the trial .... At the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by "harmless-error" standards. The existence of such defectsdeprivation of the right to counsel, for example-requires automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process.
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Once a reviewing court decides that harmless error analysis is appropriate, its standard for performing the review depends on whether the case is before it on direct or collateral appeal. When the review is direct-for example, when a state supreme court reviews the decision of a lower state court-the reviewing court must be able to declare that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 [Vol. 87
HARMLESS REVEW OF AKE ERRORS
resolve any state or federal constitutional issues according to this standard. 5 There is a less onerous standard for collateral review of trial errors. Collateral review occurs when a federal court reviews a state courtjudgment to determine whether application of the state's law to this case violated any federal rights. 96 The reviewing court's standard is whether the trial error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. 9 7 The policy behind this lower standard for federal courts reflects the Supreme Court's concern "that granting federal collateral relief upon a mere 'reasonable possibility' that the error contributed to the verdict would be inconsistent with the historic purpose of habeas corpus to afford relief only to those who have been 'grievously wronged' by society." 9 8
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1971, Lem Davis Tuggle was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at Virginia's Mecklenberg Correctional Facility for the second degree murder of a seventeen-year-old girl. 99 In early 1983, the state granted Tuggle parole for that crime. 10 0 Four months later, on May 28, 1983, Tuggle metJessie Geneva Havens, a fifty-two year-old grandmother at an American Legion Hall dance. 10 When the dance ended at 1:00 a.m., Tuggle offered to drive Havens home. was not at issue. The Court analyzed whether a reviewing court can make an intelligent judgment about whether the erroneously admitted psychiatric testimony might have affected a capital sentencing jury or, if the scope of a violation "cannot be discerned from the record" so that "any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative" and the error could not be harmless. 1 2 He specifically stated, "From past experience, I would like to talk to an attorney. I'll probably tell you the full story later."""
Later that morning, the investigator found Havens' body in the place Tuggle described. 1 4 Havens' clothes were ripped and partially removed from her body." 5 In addition to a fatal gunshot wound to her chest, Havens had a number of bruises and abrasions on her face, neck, arms and genitals. 116 Ballistics tests identified the gun Trooper Freeman had seized from Tuggle's truck as the same gun that fired the bullet that killed Havens." 7 There was also a bite mark on Havens' right breast that a forensic odontologist determined with medical certainty that Tuggle inflicted while Havens was still alive." 8 Though there was no semen or sperm in Havens' vagina, there was evidence of penetration or manipulation. 19 [Vol. 87 quent to, rape.' 2 ' Tuggle and his counsel requested a psychiatric examination.1 22 They made this request because Tuggle had been frequently evaluated during his previous incarceration, including a 1971 evaluation for mental disorders. 123 The trial judge initially denied the request but later granted a subsequent motion for an examination based on the same grounds.
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Prior to the exam, Tuggle signed a form indicating that he understood his rights, including the right to have his lawyer present during questioning, and that he was waiving these rights voluntarily. 25 Dr. Ryan, a forensic psychiatrist, and Dr. Centor, a clinical psychologist, performed the evaluation.' 2 6 They reported that Tuggle was fit to stand trial and that he was sane at the time of the crime. 27 Though the doctors also reached a conclusion about Tuggle's future dangerousness, they withheld this opinion since the court had not asked for it.128 When the doctors presented the results of this examination, Tuggle requested state funds for a subsequent exam by an independent psychiatrist of his counsel's choosing.' 29 
Id.
The claims raised concerning the penalty trial and sentence review were:
Psychiatric exam performed outside counsel's presence; Prejudicial or improper jury instructions; Prejudicial factors allowed to influence the sentence; and Sentence excessive and disproportionate to sentences imposed on other defendants in similar cases. Id. These claims were supported in part by the fact that the local papers published a number of articles prior to the trial that reported, among other things, that Tuggle's previous conviction for second-degree murder had included a rape charge and that Tuggle was an uncharged suspect in the rape of a 15-year-old girl. There were also instances of reporters and Sheriffs office employees contacting thejury panel about another criminal trial on which they served shortly before their acceptance onto Tuggle's panel. Finally, six members of the jury admitted to reading and remembering details from the newspaper accounts, and five of the jurors admitted that the Sheriffs Department or the media had contacted them to elicit an explanation of the reason for their lenient verdict in the other criminal case. 143 In Virginia, the death penalty shall not be imposed unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) future dangerousness (i.e., "that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.. .") and/or (2) vileness (i.e., that the defendant's conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.") VA (1983) . Barefoot requires that there must be "a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari... ; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed" in order for the Supreme Court to grant a stay of execution. Id. at 895.
159 Tugg/, 116 S. Ct. at 5. 160 Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissented, stating that despite the Fourth Circuit's failure to include a discussion of the three-part Barefoot inquiry in its opinion, there was no reason for the Court to assume that the analysis was not conducted. Id. at 5-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred in part with this reasoning. Id. at 6 (opinion of Breyer, J.). Justice Souter, too, would deny the application. Id. at 6 (opinion of Souter, J.). The per curiam opinion begins with a review of the rule from Zant v. Stephens' 6 6 which states "that a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating circumstances need not always be set aside if one aggravator is foumd to be invalid." 167 First, the Court stated that this rule would not apply in weighing states. 168 Then, the Court noted that the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit both had interpreted Zant to mean that, in nonweighing states, as long as there is one valid aggravating factor, the death sentence will stand "regardless of the reasons for which another aggravating factor may have been found to be invalid." 169 Next, the Court reviewed the procedural history of Tuggle's case.' 70 First, the Court noted that Virginia's capital punishment statute required Tuggle's sentencing jury to decide whether the prosecutor had proven the aggravating factors of future dangerousness or vileness.
17 1 If neither were present, then the jury should impose life imprisonment. 172 If one or both were present, then the jury had the discretion to sentence the defendant to death.' 7-Next, the Court reviewed Ake v. Oklahoma,' 7 4 a case decided just months after Tuggle lost his first appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The Court stated the Ake holding: when, in a death penalty sentencing, the prosecutor offers psychiatric testimony as to an indigent defendant's future dangerousness, due process guarantees the defendant's right to the assistance of a state-provided independent psychiatrist. The Court disagreed with the circuit court's analysis of Zant.
177
According to the Court, Zant involved a statutory aggravating circumstance that was struck down as unconstitutional because it did not "provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. The underlying evidence [presented to support the factor was] nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase." 178 Therefore, despite the elimination of an aggravating factor, the death sentence rested on firm ground.179
The Court stated that Tuggle's Ake error did not rest on admissible evidence like the error in Zant did. 180 Furthermore, the Court disagreed with both the Virginia court's and the Fourth Circuit's assumption that the improper psychiatric evidence had no influence on the jury's ultimate decision. 181 The Court surmised that Tuggle's inability to challenge the state's psychiatric evidence and mitigate its impact may have increased the persuasiveness of that evidence for the jury. a8 2 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the lower courts had misinterpreted Zant to mean that the presence of any valid aggravator excuses constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. 183 Therefore, the lower courts should have looked to Johnson V. Mississippi 84 as precedent for Tuggle's case, rather than looking to Zant. 18 5 The Court did point out that Zant provided the basis for harmless error review of Tuggle's case. 18 6 In its conclusion, the Court addressed the fact that when the state court found the Ake error, it had not considered what remedy was appropriate for that error. 18 7 Acknowledging that it lacked jurisdiction to make an initial ruling as to the harmlessness of an issue,' 8 8 the supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia concurred in Tuggle V, calling this a "simple case" of inadmissible evidence. 190 Citing Satterwhite v. Texas,'"" Justice Scalia stated that the jury considered improper evidence, and, accordingly, the Virginia Supreme Court should have decided whether that "constitutional error contributed to the jury's decision to impose the sentence of death."' 9 2 Since the Virginia court did not consider this issue, Justice Scalia concluded that the Fourth Circuit improperly denied habeas. 9 3 Justice Scalia thus agreed to vacate and remand the case to the Fourth Circuit, but he would have instructed the Fourth Circuit to review the case under the Brecht' 9 4 harmless error standard. 9 5 Justice Scalia asserted that Tuggle's case has persisted due to Tuggle's transformation of a simple question-"might the constitutional error have affected the decision of the capital sentencingjury?"-into a difficult question-"can a death sentence based in part on an 'invalid aggravating circumstance' still stand?"' 9 6 Justice Scalia accused the Virginia Supreme Court of answering the second question, "the wrong question," because it assumed that a reference to Zant provided an easy basis for the decision.' 9 7 Justice Scalia noted that the district court and Fourth Circuit subsequently had focused their inquiries on the result of the Virginia court's mistaken result.
198 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that even though the Supreme Court's current decision recognized the misplaced application of Zant to this case, it perpetuated "the 'invalid aggravating circumstance' camouflage that petitioner has added to a straightforward inadmissible-evidence Id. at 286 (Scalia, J., concurring). 191 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1988) (finding that upon application of harmless error analysis to the unconstitutional use of psychiatrist's testimony at a sentencing hearing, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 192 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct at 286 (ScaliaJ., concurring). The basis of the Fourth Circuit's analysis was straightforward. Tuggle's jury imposed a sentence after it found two aggravating circumstances: future dangerousness and heinousness. The jury heard that Jessie Havens made a terrible mistake when she accepted a ride from Tuggle. 20 2 Tuggle raped her. He sodomized her. He hit her. He bit her. While face to face with her, he put a gun to her chest and shot her. Then, he dumped her ravaged body over an embankment and drove off to rob a gas station at gunpoint. 20 3 For the jury, these facts satisfied the requirements of the heinousness aggravator. 20 4 But the jury also found the future dangerousness aggravator. Part of the testimony about this element came from a state psychiatrist who said that Tuggle posed a continuing threat to society. 20 5 Because there was no expert rebuttal, due to the defendant's inability to hire an expert and the state's refusal to provide one, this was an Ake error. 20 6 On his final appeal the defendant asked the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court to rule that an Ake error should never be subject to harmless error analysis because it is a structural error in the trial.
2 0 7 Both courts rejected the argument. 208 This Note argues that the facts and circumstances of Tuggle's case clearly show that an Ake error is not a structural error, but merely a trial error. The Fourth Circuit's harmless error analysis was appropriate and yielded the right result.
A. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING ERRORS
In his last appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Tuggle argued that Ake errors are structural and compel automatic reversal. 20 9 This argument has its roots in three sources: the Ake opinion itself; the general belief that no constitutional error in a capital trial could be harmless; and the specific assertion that Ake errors are not harmless because of the identity of the expert involved.
In the Ake opinion,Justice Marshall concluded that the state has a constitutional duty to provide a psychiatrist to an indigent defendant under certain circumstances. Lorenger asserts that when a defendant does not rebut psychiatric testimony with an expert of his own, the jury could discern an acquiescence in the state's psychiatric conclusions.
8
Although the case for extremely careful review of errors in capital trials is beyond argument, Tuggle's case proves that there is no need to treat those errors as structural; appellate courts do have the tools to review those errors and reach fair decisions.
Tuggle's sentencing proceeding clearly contained an Ake error. Prior to trial, the judge agreed that Tuggle's motion requesting a psychiatric evaluation had merit. 229 Therefore, Tuggle met the threshold burden required by Ake, and he should have had his own psychiatrist on his defense team. The Supreme Court acknowledged this and directed the Fourth Circuit to assess this issue. 230 There are two reasons why this was the proper procedural approach: first, Ake errors are trial errors and, second, the court had a full record for evaluating the impact of this particular Ake error.
First, there is a fundamental difference between Ake errors and errors already classified by the Supreme Court as structural. Structural errors impose a total disability on the defendant and'thus are presumed to infect every aspect of the trial.231 The right to counsel, for example, is guaranteed by the Constitution regardless of the case or the defendant 2 32 This right attaches automatically with no special showing required of the defendant. Access to a psychiatrist, however, is not automatic. The Ake rule requires the defendant to meet an initial burden before that right attaches. 2 33 Such a conditional right "[cannot] fairly be defined as basic to the structure of a constitutional trial."234 The Ake error in Tuggle's case is even more readily defined as a trial error, rather than a structural error, since it occurred only in the sentencing proceeding. that the jury acted irrationally when it characterized this as horrible, inhuman torture, the product of a depraved mind, and/or an aggravated battery. 23 6 Since there is no degree of heinousness in nonweighing states like Virginia, this aggravator's impact is neither lessened nor heightened in any way because of other aggravators or mitigators. But, as the Supreme Court stated, the error in Tuggle's case could not be dismissed solely because this factor was unimpeached. 2 37 The appellate court had to assess whether the Ake error made the entire trial so unfair as to give rise to a constitutional right to a reversal. [Vol. 87
had included a conclusion about future dangerousness, 2 44 he requested and was denied an additional assessment by a psychiatrist of his choosing. 2 45 The Fourth Circuit stated that this denial was merely an improper exclusion of evidence, similar to a denial of the right to cross-examine a witness, so was no different than a harmless improper admission of evidence. 248 Language in the Ake opinion lends support to this analysis. Justice Marshall wrote: This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist... who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.
47
The Fourth Circuit correctly held that Tuggle did not receive that assistance. However, restricting a defendant's right to formulate the game plan for his defense before he even enters the courtroom is not quite the same as restricting a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness. Nevertheless, the court's subsequent analysis supports the ultimate decision that, though unconstitutional, the Ake error here was harmless.
To determine whether this second part of the Ake error was harmless, the Fourth Circuit divided the sentencing evidence into six areas:
(1) the strength of the remaining aggravating circumstance; (2) the evidence admitted (both properly and improperly) at the sentencing hearing to establish the invalid aggravating circumstance; (3) the evidence improperly excluded at the sentencing hearing; (4) the nature of any mitigating evidence; (5) the closing argument of the prosecutor; and (6) any indications that the jury was hesitant or entertained doubt in reaching its sentencing determination. 2 48 The strength of the remaining aggravator has already been addressed, as has the inadmissible evidence for the future dangerousness aggravator. The admissible evidence for that aggravator included Tuggle's prior murder conviction, the fact that he murdered Havens while on parole after serving only eleven of the twenty year sentence for that earlier crime, his escape from prison, and the armed robbery he com-244 Dr. Centor did not include his conclusions about Tuggle's future dangerousness in his report since the court had not asked for such an evaluation. Instead, his report focused solely on Tuggle's competence to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the crime. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Tuggle v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996) 
